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ABSTRACT
Children are being murdered for life insurance proceeds.
Of course, if a beneficiary murders a child for the recovery of life
insurance money and if he is apprehended, he will surely face numerous
legal consequences. He will not recover the insurance money, he will be
prosecuted and likely sentenced to lfe imprisonment or execution, he may
be sued for the wrongful death of the child and he may be prosecuted for
insurance fraud. However, all of these legal responses are triggered by the
death of the child and, therefore, do not serve to protect the child from
being murdered in the first instance.
On the other hand, there are legal doctrines in place that would
appear to be directed toward protecting a child from being the target of a
murderous beneficiary, most notably the insurable interest doctrine.
t Associate Professor, Campbell University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Megan Greene, Michael Dunn, and Johnathon Naylor for their research assistance.
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Pertinent to this Article, this doctrine is intended to limit the pool of
potential beneficiaries to a lfe insurance policy to those who, out of love
and affection, would never consider murdering the child for money.
However, the doctrine is often vaguely defined by the courts and loosely
applied by insurance companies when issuing ife insurance policies.
This Article explains the risk lfe insurance policies pose to children,
discusses the ineffectiveness of current legal measures to protect children in
such instances, and proposes significant but necessary measures to protect
children from being murdered for ife insurance money.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has served as a familiar fictional storyline for decades: a murderer
kills his victim to recover, directly or indirectly, the life insurance
proceeds.'
In the typical scenario, the victim is found deceased and the police
eventually conclude that he was murdered. The detectives remain baffled as
to both motive and potential suspects. The decedent was a faithful spouse
and a respected businessperson with adoring employees, so the motive for
his murder is not immediately discovered. Concluding the murder was not
motivated by either love or hate, the detectives begin looking for the
money.
Assuming the victim was a person with assets, he likely had a will.
Naturally, the detectives acquire the decedent's will and learn that his wife
was his sole beneficiary. After determining the wife had no lover on the
side but was a faithful spouse to the end, and that she already had access to
everything she would receive under the will, she is eliminated as a suspect.
She had no reason to commit murder to receive that to which she already
had access.
Then, the detectives think to check for life insurance policies and find
that the victim had in place a policy in the amount of $1,000,000 payable to
one or perhaps several beneficiaries, including the victim's spouse. Now,
the spouse becomes a suspect once again. This is "new money," money to
which she had no access until the death of her husband.
Perhaps they further discover that the victim's business partner and
dear friend of thirty years, and also a beneficiary to the life insurance
policy, needs a considerable sum of money to cover his gambling debt.
1. See, e.g., Double Indemnity (Paramount Pictures 1944) (portraying a wife who seduces
her lover, who is also her husband's insurance agent, into murdering her husband to recover the
proceeds of an "accident" policy).
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The discovery of the insurance policy and its beneficiaries, on
occasion, quickly lead to the undoing of the murderer when the police find
the murder weapon hidden in the spouse's gym locker or beneath the
floorboards of the partner's office. On other occasions, the writers avoid
this common ending and use the discovery of the life insurance policy as a
suspenseful diversion. The viewers or readers are set to condemn the
beneficiary of the policy, the motive is so strong after all, when in the
waning minutes or pages the detectives discover that the decedent's old
college roommate committed the murder because the victim wronged him
thirty years ago.
Either way, "murder for life insurance money" is a common theme,
most likely because the viewers and readers so readily follow the logic and
the motive. There is little room to doubt that there are those who have
dreamt of waking one morning to discover that some distant relative has
passed away leaving hundreds of thousands of dollars in insurance money
to be shared by all of the decedent's kin. It does not stretch the imagination
any farther to suppose that, on occasion, a particularly greedy and immoral
beneficiary might want to hasten his good fortune by committing murder. If
the insured was paying the policy premiums, the result is a complete
windfall to the beneficiary. Even if the beneficiary was paying the policy
premiums, perhaps even $100 per month for a year or so, where could he
find a better return on investment or a faster or more certain avenue to a
get-rich-quick ending?
Whether art imitates life, life imitates art, or there is some combination
of the two, the storyline is further believable because it happens in "real
life." It is not at all uncommon to read a newspaper or online article
detailing nonfictional instances where an insured person was murdered for
life insurance proceeds.2
As horrifying as this storyline is in real life, it is even more tragic
when the insured life is a child and the beneficiary murders the child for the
insurance proceeds. Children, being among the most vulnerable of victims,
are usually in no position to understand the position they are in, to see the
danger approaching, or to defend against the threat of death. A life
insurance policy, at least in certain circumstances and particularly where the
potential proceeds are quite large, essentially paints a target on the child
victim. The child's life becomes somewhat of a commodity because of the
life insurance policy.
2. See, e.g., Miami Man Who Killed Bride for Insurance Money Gets Life, CBS NEWS
CRIMESIDER (May 14, 2014, 11:50 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/miami-man-who-killed-
bride-for-insurance-money-gets-life/ (reporting on a man who murdered his new wife in order to
collect one millions dollars in life insurance proceeds).
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Of course the law has in place certain legal devices intended to protect
the child in the first instance.3 Further, there are a variety of legal devices in
place to punish the murderer after the murder has occurred.' However, the
legal devices intended to protect children are, for the most part, fraught with
problems that make them ineffective in some instances, and the legal
devices in place to punish the murderer presume the murder itself, thus
making them ineffective to protect children.' An insurance policy that
provides a significant payout of money upon the death of a child
unfortunately creates a tremendous incentive and opportunity for someone
to commit the heinous act of murdering the child to receive the payout, and
the law in its current state actually provides very little protection to a child
in this scenario.
Part I of this Article sets out an unbelievable but unfortunate true story
about a young person named Brian who was murdered for no other reason
than the fact that a large insurance policy had been issued on his life. His
story is a large inspiration behind this Article. Part II examines the legal
devices currently in place to protect persons such as Brian, and discusses
how and why they fail miserably on more occasions than are acceptable.
Part III discusses the particular factual scenarios under which insured
children might become the target of a greedy murderer, either by
circumventing the law or by actually complying with the law as it now
exists. Part IV proposes a variety of new legal devices and rules that, either
in substitution for the current devices or along with them, might better serve
to protect children from such violent acts in the future. Finally, Part V
provides a conclusion to the Article.
II. A CASE ON POINT
Brian Brewington was murdered early one morning before daybreak in
a small town in North Carolina.6 The motivation behind his murder was the
recovery of life insurance proceeds from a policy naming Brian as the
insured life.' Brian was eight years old.'
Because the circumstances surrounding his death are part of the
inspiration for this Article, and because they are simultaneously incredible
and horrifying, the facts of his case are set forth here in considerable detail.
3. Infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
4. Infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
5. Infra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
6. State v. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d 496, 499 (N.C. 2000).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Brian lived with his great-grandmother, Frances (hereinafter "great-
grandmother"), and his uncle, Robert (hereinafter "uncle").' The uncle was
engaged to be married to Vera (hereinafter "girlfriend"), so she had become
familiar with Brian's home and living arrangements.'o
In April of 1997, the uncle purchased two life insurance policies: one
policy insured Brian's life in an amount slightly in excess of $58,000," and
the other insured Brian's father, Patrick (hereinafter "father"), in the amount
of $75,000.12 Both policies named the uncle as the beneficiary.' 3 To acquire
the policies, the uncle forged the father's signature on the insurance
applications. 4 Though the insurance agent who sold the policies to the
uncle did not witness Brian's father sign the application form for the policy
insuring the father or the consent form for the policy insuring Brian, the
agent signed both forms on the line marked for such a witness signature. 5
In May of 1997, the uncle and his girlfriend attempted to purchase a
lot and mobile home but were denied loan approval.'" Subsequently, the
uncle and girlfriend concocted a plan to murder Brian so they could collect
on the life insurance policy,' and to murder the great-grandmother,' 8
apparently out of necessity because Brian lived with her. The girlfriend
further solicited the assistance of her friend, Henry (hereinafter "friend") to
commit the murders, promising him "$200 or $300 Wednesday and about a
$1,000 in three to four months."'9 He consented to the arrangement.20
The uncle, the girlfriend, and her friend initially planned to murder
Brian's father and recover the life insurance proceeds from the policy that
covered him.2 ' However, after several failed attempts at murdering Brian's
father, the girlfriend suggested that they murder Brian.22 Her friend
proposed that they kidnap Brian instead and hold him for ransom, but the
9. Id.
10. See id.
I1. Id. The policy covering Brian also included a "double indemnity" clause which
provided a payout in twice the policy amount in the event death was caused by an accident.
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial para. 40, Johnson v. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co., No. 99-
CVS-3799 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. 1999).
12. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d at 499.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, paras. 30-33.
16. Brewington, 532 S.E.2d at 499.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 499, 508.
22. Id. at 508.
2016] 177
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girlfriend explained that they would get more money if they killed Brian,23
apparently having the life insurance policy in mind.
On June 1, 1997, the uncle and girlfriend finalized their plan to murder
Brian and his great-grandmother.2 4 The plan called for the uncle to rise
early in the morning and go to work as usual, while the girlfriend and her
friend committed the murders.25 The uncle instructed his girlfriend to "make
the crime look like a robbery, remove a few items such as the TV, stab [the
great-grandmother] and Brian, and set the house on fire."26 The uncle and
girlfriend later acquired a knife from an "open-air" market to use in the
planned murders.2 7
Early on the morning of June 12, 1997, the girlfriend and her friend
drove by Brian's home and honked the car horn to awaken the uncle. 28 They
then proceeded to purchase two one-gallon containers of water, empty
them, and refill them with gasoline from a local convenience store.29 They
then waited to meet with the uncle.30
Meanwhile, the uncle dressed for work and packed into his car the
insurance policies and his best clothes, which he intended to wear to both
Brian's and his great-grandmother's funerals. 3 ' He then left Brian's home,
leaving the back door unlocked, and drove to meet his girlfriend and her
friend.3 2 The uncle placed his property in his girlfriend's car and drove his
own car to work.3 3 The girlfriend and her friend drove to Brian's home.34
Upon arriving at Brian's home, the girlfriend and her friend put on
gloves and entered the house through the door Brian's uncle had left
unlocked for them.35 They carried with them the gasoline and the knife."
They entered the bedroom where Brian and his great-grandmother were
sleeping and the girlfriend told her friend to stab Brian.3 7 When the friend
was not able to bring himself to stab Brian, the two poured the gasoline on
the floor. Brian and his great-grandmother awoke and started screaming.39
23. Id.
24. Id. at 499.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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The girlfriend then stabbed Brian and her friend stabbed the great-
grandmother.4 0 Afterward, the girlfriend lit a dishcloth on a heater and
ignited the gasoline on the bedroom floor.4 1 Brian and his great
grandmother died during the fire.42
The uncle, his girlfriend, and her friend were all arrested and tried for
murder.43 The uncle was found guilty of first-degree arson, two counts of
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and two counts of first-degree
murder.44 The jury recommended death sentences for both murders, and the
court subsequently sentenced the uncle to death for each of the two
murders.4 5 These legal proceedings and remedies were, of course, after
Brian's death.
III. CURRENT SAFEGUARDS
A person who murders a child for the purpose of recovering the life
insurance proceeds on the child's life will be subject to a variety of legal
consequences that arise from criminal guilt and civil liability, assuming the
murderer is apprehended and his guilt and liability are established.46
First, it is highly unlikely that the murderer will recover the life
insurance proceeds on the child's life.47 As a general rule, either by case
law,48 statute,49 or through a provision of the policy itself,"o one who
intentionally and feloniously murders the insured for the purpose of
collecting the insurance proceeds will be disqualified from that recovery."
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 518.
43. Id. at 500.
44. Id. at 499.
45. Id.
46. Much of this Article applies equally to children and adults who are insured by life
insurance policies. But, because they are generally defenseless, naive to the insurance industry,
and surely the most vulnerable, this Article focuses on children as insureds.
47. F. S. Tinio, Annotation, Killing of Insured by Beneficiary as Affecting Life Insurance or
its Proceeds, 27 A.L.R. 3d 794, 799 (1969 & Supp. 2016) ("The beneficiary's right to recover the
proceeds, where he feloniously killed the insured, has been denied as a general rule .....
48. See id.
49. Id. at 798-99 ("In some jurisdictions, certain statutory provisions affect the right of the
killer to the proceeds. While some statutes prohibit recovery by the beneficiary without regard to
the nature of the killing, others require that the death of the insured must have been feloniously or
wilfully caused, or, as still other statutes provide, that the beneficiary must have been convicted
for the act." (footnotes omitted)).
50. Id. at 799 ("The beneficiary who takes the life of the insured may also be barred from
collecting the insurance proceeds pursuant to a provision in the policy to that effect.").
51. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A
Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 488-89 (2005) ("Accordingly, it is generally held
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Second, the murderer will likely be liable in a civil suit by the next of kin
for wrongful death based on intentional tort.52 Of course, it is probably
equally as likely the plaintiffs will never actually recover on the judgment
in this instance. Third, at least in certain instances and under certain facts,
such as where the murderer actually makes claim to the life insurance
proceeds after murdering the insured child, the murderer may face a
conviction for insurance fraud.53 Finally, the murderer will most certainly
face a murder conviction.54
Unfortunately, all of these legal consequences of the murderer's
despicable act arise after the child is murdered. Thus, while these responses
might protect against the likelihood of the murderer gaining from his
wrongdoing and going even further to punish him for the same, they do not
protect the life of the child in the first instance." By way of example, they
did not protect Brian.56
There are currently two primary legal tools in place to help safeguard
the life of a child from a would-be murderer who wishes to profit from life
insurance covering the child. The first is the deterrent effect of the threat of
apprehension, conviction, and potential life imprisonment or execution." Of
that a beneficiary who intentionally kills the insured cannot, and should not, recover the life
insurance policy benefits, and the life insurance proceeds should be paid instead to the innocent
contingent beneficiary or to the estate of the deceased. This desirable legal result-that a
beneficiary who unlawfully kills the insured is barred from receiving the proceeds of a life
insurance policy-is based on the underlying rationale that it is contrary to state public policy,
either under the common law or under a particular state's 'slayer statute,' to permit a person who
has unlawfully killed another to benefit from his or her wrongdoing." (footnotes omitted)).
52. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 294, at 804 (2000) ("Wrongful death statutes create
a new action in favor of certain beneficiaries who suffer from another's death as a result of a tort.
States differ somewhat in measurement of the damages, but all states recognize some kind of
claim. Because the statute creates a new cause of action and vests it in the survivors (or their
representative), the wrongful death recovery does not go to the deceased's estate and is not subject
to claims of the deceased's creditors.").
53. See, e.g., People v. Hardy, 825 P.2d 781, 811 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (finding the
evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit insurance
fraud because the evidence showed that defendant, "knowing he was ineligible to collect the
benefits under the policies because of his involvement with the murders, concealed that fact when
applying for the benefits.").
54. Infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
55. This statement is not intended to be an argument that the legal repercussions subsequent
to the murder of the insured child are without utility, but that it is unfortunate that they do not go
beyond the punishment of the defendant to further safeguard the child's life.
56. See supra notes 6-45 and accompanying text. Brian's uncle and beneficiary most
certainly did not receive any of the proceeds of the insurance policy covering Brian's life, and he
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. However, Brian's life was lost
before these remedies became relevant.
57. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text. The murderer's actual conviction occurs
after, and as a result of, the child's murder and does not serve to protect the child in the first
180
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course, this legal tool is a general response to murder and is not focused in
particular on murders committed for the purposes of collecting life
insurance proceeds on children. 8 Yet, to the extent such a criminal sentence
is a deterrent to murder in general, presumably it would apply in the life
insurance scenario. Unfortunately, at least in certain instances, the deterrent
effect supposedly created by the threat of apprehension and prosecution is
no deterrent at all."
The second legal tool, which is focused primarily on protecting the life
of the insured from murder, is the insurable interest doctrine. 6 0 When
applied properly by insurers, the doctrine, at least theoretically, protects
children by requiring that the insurer permit only one who has an insurable
interest in the child's life to become a beneficiary to the child's life
insurance policy in the first instance.61 When applied narrowly by the civil
courts, the doctrine substantially limits the list of individuals who have the
sufficient legal interest in the child's life to be deemed an insurable interest
and, therefore, limits the number of individuals who might economically
benefit from the child's death.6 2 In this instance, the doctrine also likely
produces at least some deterrent effect in that, at least theoretically, even if
the would-be murderer without an insurable interest is able to defraud an
insurer into making him the beneficiary under the policy, and even if he is
not apprehended and convicted, the courts will not enforce the policy. 6 3
instance. However, the threat of conviction may in some instances be sufficient to deter the
would-be murderer and, therefore, protect the child's life.
58. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) ("The death penalty is said to
serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders.").
59. Id. at 185-86 ("Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not
function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical
evidence either supporting or refuting this view. We may nevertheless assume safely that there are
murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent
effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent." (footnote
omitted)).
60. See infra notes 121-69 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
63. Robert S. Bloink, Catalysts for Clarification: Modern Twists on the Insurable Interest
Requirement for Life Insurance, 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 55, 62 (2010) ("While ... in at least some
cases the insurable interest requirement is insufficient to eliminate the motivation of an individual
with a criminal disposition to use life insurance as part of a nefarious scheme, the requirement is
likely to have at least some deterrent effect by exponentially increasing the difficulty of securing a
death benefit payout in the absence of an insurable interest."). Of course, this deterrent effect
hinges on the would-be murderer knowing that, notwithstanding the fact the insurer permitted him
to become a beneficiary while not having a legal insurable interest, the insurer will not pay the
benefit upon discovering the absence of an insurable interest and he will not recover if forced into
the civil courts to enforce the policy terms.
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Thus, the would-be murderer would be subjecting himself to considerable
risk and would not benefit from his act in any event.64
Unfortunately, courts frequently fail to narrowly define the insurable
interest doctrine,65 and insurers frequently fail to properly apply it.66 Even
when the doctrine is narrowly defined and properly applied, a bit of
planning permits a murderer to circumvent the doctrine and once again
subject a child to the threat of murder. 67
A. Deterrent Effect of Apprehension and Prosecution
Murder motivated by anger can, of course, support a finding of
premeditation and a first degree murder conviction. 68 Accordingly, the
convicted murderer might be subject to the potential consequences of life
imprisonment or execution. 69 However, criminal law also recognizes that a
murder committed in anger might occur under such circumstances that the
murderer acted out of a spontaneous fit of rage and without premeditation,
and therefore committed second-degree murder.70 The law also recognizes
that a person might kill another in anger, but under adequate provocation or
in the "heat of passion" such that the defendant is convicted of
manslaughter." In both instances, the absence of premeditation serves to
reduce the severity of the crime, 72 and therefore, the punishment.
64. See id.
65. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 173-208 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., People v. Lunafelix, 214 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]he law does
not require that a first degree murderer have a 'rational' motive for killing. Anger at the way the
victim talked to him or any motive, 'shallow and distorted but, to the perpetrator, genuine' may be
sufficient." (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Smith, 108 Cal. Rptr. 698, 709 (Ct. App. 1973),
disapproved ofon other grounds by People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1978) (en banc))).
69. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17(a) (2011 & Supp. 2012) ("A murder which shall be
perpetrated by [any] means of ... premeditated killing . .. shall be deemed to be murder in the
first degree, a Class A felony, and any person who commits such murder shall be punished with
death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole as the court shall determine ...
70. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 680 (Ct. App. 1998)
("Unpremeditated murder resulting from spontaneous rage is normally second degree murder.").
71. See, e.g., State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252, 256 (N.C. 1987) ("[U]nder certain
circumstances, one who kills another human being in the 'heat of passion,' produced by adequate
provocation sufficient to negate malice, is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder." (citing
State v. Robbins, 309 S.E.2d 188, 191 (N.C. 1983); State v. Jones, 261 S.E.2d 1, 6 (N.C. 1980),
overruled on other grounds by State v. McAvoy, 417 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1992))).
72. See, e.g., State v. McCollum, 579 S.E.2d 467, 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("Murder in
the first degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and
deliberation. Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice but
without premeditation and deliberation. Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice and without premeditation and deliberation. Involuntary
182 [Vol. 58:173
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However, when it can be established that the motive for murder was
the recovery of the proceeds of a life insurance policy covering a child, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that premeditation was involved.7 3 The
murderer must plan in such a way to become the child's life insurance
beneficiary,74 or plan in some way to benefit from the person who is the
child's beneficiary," and then plan to commit the murder in such a way as
to avoid suspicion.76 Thus, it would seem that one who murders for the
purpose of collecting life insurance proceeds would, if convicted, almost
always be subject to a first-degree murder conviction based on
premeditation, and life imprisonment or execution.
While the law frequently finds it convenient to engage in the legal
fiction that "every one is presumed to know the law,"78 such a fiction would
hardly seem necessary in this instance. Anyone who has the intellect to
"game" the life insurance industry so as to benefit, directly or indirectly,
from a child's life insurance policy, and to then commit premeditated
murder, would likely have the intellect to understand that the potential
consequences include life imprisonment or execution.79 Accordingly, it
would seem that a murderer who plans and plots the murder of a child in
order to gain financially through life insurance proceeds would be aware
that he may ultimately face the most serious legal consequences that the law
allows, life imprisonment or execution, and would therefore be deterred
from committing the murder.
Without doubt, these deterrent forces work in many instances even
though it is impossible to prove empirically just how effective they are.so
manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, without premeditation and
deliberation, and without intention to kill or inflict serious bodily injury." (quoting State v.
Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905, 915 (N.C. 1978))).
73. See, e.g., State v. White, 457 S.E.2d 841, 857 (N.C. 1995) ("[E]vidence that defendant
became one of the beneficiaries of an insurance policy on the victim's life days before he was
killed was relevant to show her motive for murdering her stepson. This evidence tended to prove
that defendant murdered the victim, at least in part, to collect the insurance proceeds from the
victim's life insurance policy.").
74. See, e.g., supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. In Brian's case, set forth in Part I
of this Article, Brian's uncle essentially defrauded the insurer into making him a beneficiary to the
policy covering Brian's life.
75. See, e.g., supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. Brian's uncle's fiancde intended to
benefit from the marriage to Brian's uncle, the uncle being the beneficiary under a life insurance
policy covering Brian's life.
76. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text. Brian's murderers set fire to the house
to make it appear that Brian died from a fire.
77. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
78. E.g., Iterman v. Baker, 15 N.E.2d 365, 370 (Ind. 1938).
79. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
80. Obviously, where the threat of prosecution successfully serves as a deterrent, the
would-be murderer decides against committing the crime and his aborted intentions are rarely
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One conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that they do not deter in all
instances.
By way of example, they failed miserably in Brian's case." Perhaps
those who planned and carried out Brian's murder thought they would
never be apprehended, or perhaps the temptation of a payout in the
thousands of dollars made the risk worth it. 2 While the psychological
makeup of the criminal mind and its responsiveness to deterrents and
motivation is outside the scope of this Article,83 it is clear that the threat of
criminal punishment is not sufficient to protect children in all instances,
discovered. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976) ("Statistical attempts to evaluate
the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a
great deal of debate. The results simply have been inconclusive." (footnote omitted)).
81. There is likely little doubt that Brian's uncle, and his conspirators, knew the risk they
were taking but were not deterred in their conduct.
82. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. The dollar value of the risk taken by
Brian's uncle was a life insurance payout of $58,552. The policy also contained a double
indemnity clause which would provide a double payout of $117,104 if Brian's death was caused
by accident. Perhaps this is the reason his murderers set fire to Brian's residence. The payout to
the uncle's girlfriend presumably would have been to share with the uncle the $117,104.
Interestingly, and most alarmingly, the value of the risk taken by the girlfriend's friend to assist in
the commission of the murders was only around $1,200 to $1,300. See supra notes 11-16 and
accompanying text.
83. See generally, Hummayoun Naeem et al., Pain - Pleasure Theory of Motivation,
INTERDISC. J. CONTEMP. RES. Bus., June 2011, at 1489, 1489, 1493 ("The pain pleasure theory of
motivation is based upon the assumption that human nature seeks pleasure and avoids pain. One is
never comfortable in painful situation [sic] and in order to get rid of that painful situation, the
individual puts efforts to come out and seeks pleasure. Level of efforts put to avoid pain indicates
motivation level. In order to support the assumption, a scale indicating 5 different stages i.e. 20,
40, 60, 80, & 100 was developed. These stages indicate pleasure level of an individual. According
to the theory, if an individual reaches the stage of 20 and gets stuck at this stage, either he will
show his satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In case of satisfaction, he will not put any more effort to
reach [the] next stage, he will be happy [with] whatever he has got. In case of dissatisfaction, he is
going to face two situations; he will put more efforts to reach [the] next stage and may manage to
reach the target stage; otherwise, his dissatisfaction would lead towards anxiety and depression.
This psychological state would further lead towards two behavior patterns; either he will go to
seek medical help or his psychological disorders will get intensified which will finally lead
towards abnormal behavior patterns. . . . He may develop criminal inclinations starting from
snatching and stealing to high level planned robberies."); Charles R. Tittle and Ekaterina V.
Botchkovar, Self-Control, Criminal Motivation and Deterrence: An Investigation Using Russian
Respondents, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 307, 309 (2005) ("Self-control theory contends that all people
face temptations (opportunities) for gratifying but potentially costly behavior, with the strongly
self-controlled tending to resist while the weakly controlled tend to succumb. Since opportunities
for misbehavior are ubiquitous, low self-control is claimed to be the main cause of all known
variations, except by age, in criminal probability among individuals and socio-demographic
categories. Age variation is presumably inexplicable with social variables .... ".(citations
omitted)).
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particularly when the murderer stands to recover thousands or even
hundreds of thousands of dollars in life insurance money. 84
B. Insurable Interest Doctrine
The second legal device in place to protect insureds, including
children, from being murdered for the recovery of insurance proceeds is the
insurable interest doctrine. The doctrine applies primarily to life insurance
and to property insurance." Briefly stated, the doctrine provides that before
a person can recover for the loss of the insured life of another or for the loss
or damage to insured property, he must have an "insurable interest" in the
insured life," or in the insured property."
While this Article focuses on life insurance, and particularly on life
insurance covering children, it may be helpful to first examine the
application of the insurable interest doctrine to property insurance. The
doctrine appears to have arisen first in property insurance or, more
precisely, marine insurance." Further, its application to life insurance
84. See, e.g., State v. Milke, 865 P.2d 779, 781-82 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (affirming
defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, where defendant conspired to kill her four-year-
old son after she took out a $5,000 life insurance policy on him which named her as the
beneficiary); Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1077, 1081-82 (Ind. 1990) (affirming defendant's
conviction for murdering her two infant children, where defendant was the beneficiary to life
insurance policies in the amounts of $5,000 on one child's life and $20,000 on the other); Wilson
v. State, 764 A.2d 284, 288, 290 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (affirming defendant's conviction for
first-degree murder of his infant son, where defendant was the beneficiary of two life insurance
policies on the infant, one for $50,000 and one for $100,000), rev'd, 803 A.2d 1034 (Md. 2002);
Conley v. State, 1999-KA-00521-SCT (T 1, 4) (Miss. 2001) (affirming defendant's conviction for
capital murder, where defendant murdered his three-year-old daughter after purchasing a $100,000
life insurance policy on her); Hill v. State, 1999-KA-01511 -SCT (T 1, 18) (Miss. 2001) (affirming
defendant's conviction for murder, where defendant suffocated her infant son after taking out a
$10,000 life insurance policy on him so that she would have enough money to bond her husband
out ofjail); Merritt v. State, 339 So. 2d 1366, 1367 (Miss. 1976) (affirming defendant's conviction
for the murder of his two-year-old daughter, where defendant was the beneficiary of a $25,000 life
insurance policy on her); State v. White, 457 S.E.2d 841, 845-47 (N.C. 1995) (affirming
defendant's conviction for the first-degree murder of her stepson, where defendant had been
named a co-beneficiary to a $15,000 life insurance policy on her stepson just days before he was
murdered); O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (affirming
defendant's conviction for capital murder, where defendant murdered his eight-year-old son after
taking out multiple life insurance policies on him, including one for $10,000 and another for
$20,000).
85. See infra notes 91-169 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 122-69 and accompanying text.
88. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN 1. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.2, at 142-43
(1988).
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
appears to have been, intentionally or otherwise, patterned somewhat after
its application to property insurance.89
1. Insurable Interests in Property Insurance
The insurable interest doctrine, as applied to marine insurance,
originated in early English statutory law through the Statute of George 11.90
The preamble of the Statute of George II declared that such insurance
contracts had "been productive of many pernicious practices,
whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, have . . . been -
fraudulently lost and destroyed, . . . " and whereby there was
introduced "a mischievious kind of gaming or wagering, under the
pretence of assuring the risque on shipping." The Statute of George
II, which applied only to marine insurance, declared that "no
assurance or assurances shall be made . . . interest or no interest, or
without further proof of interest than the policy, or by way of gaming
or wagering, or without benefit of salvage to the assurer; and that
every such assurance shall be null and void to all intents and
purposes." 9 1
The wrong to be remedied and the remedy itself are found within the
language of the statute.92 insureds were acquiring marine insurance
contracts covering ships and cargoes in which the insureds had no property
interest.93 Thus, the insureds were effectively engaging in "a mischievious
kind of gaming or wagering," 94 or essentially gambling that the ship or
cargo would be lost and then recover a windfall because they received a
large insurance payout for the meager cost of the contract itself but without
any property loss of their own. To eliminate the mischief and harm
associated with gambling, the statute made such insurance contracts "null
and void." 95
However, the statute refers to another, more sinister wrong that is of
greater importance to this Article. Those who purchased such insurance
contracts without an insurable interest would not always rely upon fate to
create the loss, but would on occasion cause the ship and cargo to be
"fraudulently lost and destroyed."" The insured would recover a large
insurance payout with no property loss of his own, but this time through the
89. See id. § 3.3, at 151, 155.
90. Id. § 3.2, at 142.
91. Id. at 142-43 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marine Insurance Act, 1745, 19 Geo. 2 c. 37
(Gr. Brit.), repealed by Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7 c. 41, § 92, sch. 2. (U.K.)).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 142.
94. Id. (quoting 19 Geo. 2 c. 37).
95. Id. at 143 (quoting 19 Geo. 2 c. 37).
96. Id. at 142 (quoting 19 Geo. 2 c. 37).
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act of actually causing the loss to the property.9 7 The remedy, again, was to
make such contracts "null and void."98
In summary, England's early insurable interest doctrine required the
insured to have some economic, or insurable, interest in the property that
was the subject of the insurance, or else the insured would be wrongfully
gambling or wagering and may even be tempted to cause the destruction of
the property itself in order to recover the insurance proceeds. 99 The
insurable interest doctrine, at least theoretically, would avoid the problem
with random gambling and also serve to deter the insured from destroying
the property to simply recover in money what he had lost in property. 100
Though now the subject of statutes in some jurisdictions,'o in the
United States the insurable interest doctrine for purposes of property
insurance was largely adopted by common law.' 02 Generally consistent with
the policy of England, 0 3 and the English statute,1 0 4 the courts typically state
that the objectives of the doctrine are to preclude wagering,'0 o and to avoid
the creation of a temptation to destroy the subject property for the recovery
of the insurance proceeds.1 0 6 To accomplish the doctrine's objectives, courts
require the insured to have some ownership or other interest in the
property, 07 sufficient for the insured to suffer a loss by the destruction of
the property.'0o
97. See id.
98. Id. at 143 (quoting 19 Geo. 2 c. 37).
99. See id. at 142-43.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 12-301(b) (LexisNexis 2011) ("A contract of property
insurance or a contract of insurance of an interest in or arising from property is enforceable only
for the benefit of a person with an insurable interest in the property at the time of the loss.").
102. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.2, at 147.
103. Pritchet v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 3 Yeates 458, 464 (Pa. 1803) ("We have adopted the
policy and principles [13] which gave rise to the act of parliament, both in courts ofjustice and by
commercial usage; but we are not prepared to say, that every particular provision or resolution
under it, has been engrafted into our system of law.").
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Castle Cars, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 273 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Va.
1981) ("The reasons for the rule are grounded in public policy. 'If ... one insures the property of
another, the contract of insurance is void and carries with it temptations to crime into which we
should not be led. It is against public policy."' (quoting Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Bolling, 10 S.E.2d 518, 520 (Va. 1940))).
106. See, e.g., Delk v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 2003 OK 88, ¶ 9, 81 P.3d 629, 635 ("The
distinction between wagering and insurance is now so firmly established in public perception, that
the justification for the insurable interest doctrine is more readily apprehended today as the
prevention of unproductive and wasteful commercial transactions, the limitation of insurance to
true indemnity, and the deterrence of the fraudulent destruction of insured property." (footnotes
omitted)).
107. Warren v. Davenport Fire Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 464, 468 (1871) ("An 'insurable interest' is
sui generis, and peculiar in its texture and operation. It sometimes exists where there is not any
present property, orjus in re, orjus ad rem. Yet such a connection must be established between
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The doctrine requires not only that the insured have an insurable
interest in the property, but also limits the amount of the insurance recovery
to the value of the insurable interest the insured had in the property.109
Accordingly, if the insured has an interest valued at $1,000 in an item of
property, he cannot recover in excess of that amount even if he insured the
property at a greater amount.
Of significant importance is the fact that the doctrine does not appear
to place any enforceable obligation on the insurer to ascertain whether the
insured has an insurable interest in the property before issuing the policy."1o
"[Ijn some contexts-including several types of property insurance-
insurers typically will only make a careful examination after a loss occurs
(1) of whether the requisite interest exists or (2) of the value of an insured's
interest.""' Instead, the doctrine merely makes such a policy null and void
such that the insured who had no insurable interest in the property cannot
recover after the property is damaged or destroyed.1 12 For this reason, the
doctrine does not so much serve the intended deterrent purposes of
preventing wagering or the intentional destruction of property on the front-
end when the policy is issued, but rather serves as a defense the insurer
might raise to avoid paying the proceeds on the back-end after the property
is damaged or destroyed.1 13
the subject-matter insured, and the party in whose behalf the insurance has been effected, as may
be sufficient for the purpose of deducing the existence of a loss to him from the occurrence of the
injury to it." (citing Buck v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 151, 152 (1828))); see also Keeton &
Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.4, at 164 ("The basic types of property interests include: (1) Property
(ownership) rights; (2) Contract rights; (3) Legal liabilities; (4) Representative relationships; and
(5) Factual expectancies." (footnote omitted)).
108. Smith v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1963) ("The principle may be
stated generally that anyone has an insurable interest in property who derives a benefit from its
existence or would suffer loss from its destruction.") (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.4, at 164 ("In general, the existence of an insurable interest
in property covered by a contract of insurance is determined on the basis of whether the insured's
relationship to the property is such that as a consequence of an injury to the property a loss will be
sustained by the insured.").
109. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.4, at 173 ("The objectives that underlie the
insurable interest doctrine and the principle of indemnity include avoiding inducements to
wagering, avoiding inducements to destruction of insured property, and avoiding net gain to an
insured through receipt of insurance proceeds that exceed the loss suffered by the claimant."
(emphasis added)).
110. Id. § 3.3, at 162-63.
Ill. Id. at 150.
112. See, e.g., Warren, 31 Iowa at 467 ("Upon the ground of public policy, therefore, if the
assured have no interest in the thing insured the policy must be held void.").
113. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.3, at 156 ("The full implementation of the public
interest that produced the insurable interest doctrine may be impeded if insurers elect not to
question the adequacy or existence of the required interest. Indeed, an examination of cases in
which the doctrine has been asserted as a defense by insurers suggests that in many (and perhaps
most) instances the motivation for an insurer to raise the lack of insurable interest is to defeat a
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Accordingly, such a practice by insurers may lead to a person who
wishes to insure his neighbor's property on a wager that the property might
be destroyed to successfully purchase such a policy. If so, the insured
effectively wagers the cost of a property insurance premium against the
possibility that his neighbor's property will be destroyed." 4 If the property
is destroyed by means other than at the hands of the insured, and if the
insured makes a claim on the loss, the insurer might then investigate and
determine that the insured had no insurable interest in property and raise its
absence as a defense to paying the claim."' In this instance, the insurable
interest doctrine has not prevented wagering through an insurance policy,
but at least the insured will not recover from his wager. Even if the
insured's lack of an insurable interest is not discovered, the insured has
committed nothing more than a form of gambling that is perhaps frowned
upon by public policy."' He did not cause the loss to the owner of the
property and will not be civilly or criminally responsible for the loss."' In
short, the insured gambled on the loss, but he did nothing to cause it.
However, such a practice by insurers may lead to a person insuring his
neighbor's property and subsequently hastening the process by actually
causing the destruction of his neighbor's property. If the insurer then
investigates and discovers the insured had no insurable interest, it will again
raise the insurable interest doctrine as a defense and defeat the insured's
claim."' Further, because the insured actually caused the loss in this
instance, if his actions are discovered he may be held civilly and criminally
responsible for causing the loss." 9 However, even if the insured's lack of an
insurable interest and his misdeeds go undiscovered, he will simply recover
money to which he is not legally entitled and avoid civil and criminal
liability.' 20 Of course, the true owner of the property will have to replace his
property at his own expense or rely upon his own insurance coverage to
replace the property. However, generally speaking, the property is
replaceable and, even if it is not, it ultimately is still just property.
claim when an insurer either has some evidence or has strong suspicions of fraud, and that the
existence of the fraud would be more difficult for the insurer to establish than a defense based on
the lack of an insurable interest." (footnote omitted)).
114. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW §
44, at 299 (4th ed. 2007); see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
115. Id. § 40, at 294-95; see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
117. Cf Jacob Loshin, Insurance Law's Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable
Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 483 (2007).
118. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
119. Loshin, supra note 117, at 483.
120. See id.
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While such after-the-fact investigation and enforcement does not
necessarily prevent either wagering or the intentional destruction of
property, only property is at stake. However, where the subject is life
insurance rather than property insurance, the stakes are much higher.
2. Insurable Interests in Life Insurance
As was the case for the insurable interest doctrine's application to
property insurance, its application to life insurance was also the subject of
an early English statute.121 However, the statute that addressed life
insurance differed in one very important way from the statute that addressed
property insurance.
The next major statutory contribution to the development of the
insurable interest doctrine in England was enacted in 1774, during the
reign of George III. The preamble to this statute addressed "a
mischievous kind of gaming" in relation to "the making of insurances
on lives, or other events, wherein the assured shall have no interest."
Nothing was said of the destruction of the subject matter of
insurance, an evil that was specifically adverted to in the preamble of
the marine insurance act of 1746. Apparently, the members of
Parliament were not inclined to charge that no-interest life insurance
had produced pernicious practices that amounted to murder. The
1774 act declared that "no insurance shall be made ... on the life or
lives of any person or persons, or on any other event or events
whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for whose use, benefit, or
on whose account such policy or policies shall be made, shall have no
interest .. 122
In England, there appears to have arisen a type of side-line business
whereby individuals would purchase life insurance policies covering the
lives of criminals who might face execution, thus essentially wagering that
they would, in fact, be executed, as well as on the lives of the elderly. 123
Thus, while the statute that addressed insurable interests in property sought
121. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 88, § 3.2(b), at 143.
122. Id. (footnotes omitted).
123. See Swisher, supra note 51, at 481 ("In life insurance, [wagering or] 'gaming' practices
developed in the eighteenth century. Popular accounts of the period describe the practice of
purchasing insurance on the lives of those being tried for capital crimes. These policies constituted
naked wagers on whether the accused would ultimately be convicted and executed for the alleged
offense. A related practice was the purchase of insurance on the lives of famous, elderly persons;
the premium would be a function of what was known about the person's health, including any
recent illnesses. Insuring a life in which one has no interest creates a temptation to bring the
insured's life to an early end, but the greater concern in eighteenth-century England was the
practice of wagering." (alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 40, at 292 (3d ed. 2002))).
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to avoid both "wagering" and the "pernicious practices" of intentionally
causing the loss of a ship and its cargo,1 24 the statute that addressed
insurable interests in life insurance perhaps focused more on the practices
of the day and sought to avoid only "a mischievous kind of gaming."l 25
In the United States, similar to the doctrine's adoption for purposes of
property insurance,1 2 6 the doctrine has been adopted for life insurance
through common law,127 and by statute.1 28 Unlike the doctrine's application
to property insurance, however, the insurable interest doctrine's application,
or misapplication, to life insurance can result in very dangerous
consequences for the insured's life.1 29
Many American courts today continue to state that the purpose of the
insurable interest doctrine in life insurance is to avoid gaming, gambling, or
wagering.' 30 Others have noted that the doctrine's purpose is also to avoid
creating in the beneficiary of the policy a temptation to commit murder to
124. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
127. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.2(e), at 147.
128. Id.
129. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins. v. Lewis, 535 F. Supp. 2d. 755, 759 (S.D.
Miss. 2008) ("'Mississippi follows the general rule that in order to be entitled to proceeds from an
insurance policy, the purchaser of the policy must have an insurable interest in the property or life
insured.' This rule 'is based on the public policy that one should not be permitted to wager on or
have a direct interest in the loss of life or property of another."' (citation omitted) (quoting Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Davidson, 715 F. Supp. 775, 776 (S.D. Miss. 1989))); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24, 27 (1884) ("The policy is a common form of what is called life
insurance, and is a contract by which the insurer, in consideration of an annual payment to be
made by the assured, promises to pay to her a certain sum upon the death of the person whose life
is insured. To prevent this from being void, as a mere wager upon the continuance of a life in
which the parties have no interest except that created by the wager itself, it is necessary that the
assured should have some pecuniary interest in the continuance of the life insured."); Crosswell v.
Conn. Indem. Ass'n, 28 S.E. 200, 201 (S.C. 1897) ("It is firmly established that insurance
procured by one person on the life of another, in which the party effecting the insurance has no
interest, is void as a wager contract against public policy, which condemns gambling speculation
upon human life.").
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recover from the policy. 13 1 Still others combine the purposes by equating
wagering to murder. 132
It is the modem doctrine's "murder avoidance" objective that comes
into sharp focus when examining the doctrine's effectiveness in
safeguarding the lives of insured children.
Simply stated, the insurable interest doctrine-for purposes of life
insurance-provides that a person may not be the beneficiary to a life
insurance policy covering the life of another person unless he has a
sufficient relationship with the insured life to constitute an insurable
interest.1 33 Thus, the doctrine focuses on the relationship, or absence
thereof, between the insured life and the beneficiary. 134 Accordingly, if "A"
purchases a life insurance policy covering "B's" life and names himself as
the beneficiary to the policy, "A," as the beneficiary, must have an
insurable interest in "B," the insured life.' 35 Otherwise, the policy is
invalid.'36
One interesting exception to the rule of the insurable interest doctrine
applies where a person purchases a life insurance policy covering his own
life. In this instance, he may name any person or entity as beneficiary with
or without the beneficiary having an insurable interest in the insured's
life.'3 1 Perhaps this exception addresses the doctrine's original purpose of
the avoidance of wagering,'3 8  and recognizes the beneficiary is not
131. See Cisna v. Sheibley, 88 111. App. 385, 389 (1899) ("'A policy obtained by a party who
has no interest in the subject of insurance is a mere wager policy. But policies without interest
upon lives are more pernicious and dangerous than any other class of wager policies, because
temptations to tamper with life are more mischievous than incitements to pecuniary fraud."'
(quoting Ruse v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 516, 525 (1861))); Allen v. United of Omaha
Life Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) ("Two policies
drive this rule: A practice that encourages one to take another's life should be prohibited, and no
one should be permitted to wager on the life of another." (citing Torrez v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
118 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003))).
132. See, e.g., Ruse, 23 N.Y. at 526 ("[P]olicies without interest upon lives are more
pernicious and dangerous than any other class of wager policies; because temptations to tamper
with life are more mischievous than incitements to mere pecuniary frauds.").
133. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 114, § 43, at 293; see also cases cited supra notes
131-32.
134. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 114, § 43, at 293.
135. Though factually less likely, where "A" purchases a life insurance policy covering
"B's" life and names "C" as the beneficiary, "C" must have an insurable interest in "B's" life.
However, the doctrine does not necessarily suggest that "A," as the purchaser of the policy but not
its beneficiary, must also have an insurable interest in "B."
136. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 114, § 41, at 278.
137. See, e.g., Mut. Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Noah, 282 So. 2d 271, 273 (Ala. 1973) ("This rule
is to the effect that a person has an unlimited insurable interest in his own life and may designate
any person as his beneficiary so long as the insurance was procured or taken out by the insured
and the premiums paid by him .... ).
138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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gambling if he had nothing to do with the procurement of the policy.' Or,
perhaps it addresses the modem purpose of the avoidance of murder and
recognizes that the insured, who also purchased the policy, would not name
as beneficiary a person he has reason to suspect might murder him to collect
the insurance proceeds. 14 0
Where the beneficiary must have an insurable interest in the life of the
insured, consistent with the doctrine's purpose of avoiding the creation of
an inducement to commit murder, 14 1 an insurable interest is generally
deemed to exist where the beneficiary has sufficient reason to want the life
of the insured to continue to exist. 142 To that end, the doctrine generally
requires either that the beneficiary have a sufficient economic or pecuniary
interest in the continued life of the insured, or that the beneficiary have
sufficient familial ties to the insured so that his love and affection for the
insured causes the beneficiary to want the insured's life to continue. 143
Thus, the first basis that would support a finding of an insurable
interest in the life of another exists where the beneficiary has a pecuniary
interest in the life of the insured such that the beneficiary would suffer a
financial loss upon the death of the insured. 144 By way of example, a
pecuniary insurable interest may be deemed to exist where the beneficiary
139. Crosswell v. Conn. Indem. Ass'n, 28 S.E. 200, 201 (S.C. 1897) ("[I]t is also well settled
that a person may insure his own life, and make the policy payable to whomsoever he chooses,
even though the beneficiary has no insurable interest in his life, provided the transaction is bona
fide, and not a mere cover to evade the law against wager policies."); see also Keeton & Widiss,
supra note 88, § 3.5, 189 ("Sometimes decisions holding that a designation of a beneficiary
without an insurable interest or an assignment to a person without an insurable interest is valid
when made by the person whose life is insured have given little, if any, recognition to avoidance
of inducement to murder as an objective of the insurable interest doctrine. In such cases, it
frequently has been observed that the central objective of the insurable interest rule is the
avoidance of wagering, and participation in the transaction by the person whose life is insured
adequately protects against wagering." (footnote omitted)).
140. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 114, § 43, at 293 ("The person who takes out insurance
on her own life has the power to designate any beneficiary; it is presumed that the person will not
designate a beneficiary likely to murder the insured. In virtually every state, it is not necessary that
the named beneficiary have an insurable interest in the life of the insured.").
141. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 114, § 43, at 294-95.
143. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nelson, 861 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Neb. 2015) ("In Nebraska, an
'[i]nsurable interest, in the matter of life and health insurance, exists when the beneficiary because
of relationship, either pecuniary or from ties of blood or marriage, has reason to expect some
benefit from the continuance of the life of the insured."' (alteration in original) (quoting Neb. Rev.
Stat. ANN. § 44-103(13)(b) (LexisNexis 2010))); Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.5, at 179
("The common or unifying characteristic of these two types of relationships is that in both there is
a reason for the beneficiary of the life insurance to anticipate that some economic benefits either
will or may result from the continuation of the assured's life, and that such benefits will be lost in
the event of the assured's death-that is, there is a factual expectancy which will be curtailed by
the assured's death.").
144. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 114, § 43, at 296.
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and insured are business partners, 145 or where the insured is an employee of
the beneficiary's business.1 4 6
As is the case with property insurance, 14 7 such a pecuniary interest in
the insured subject discourages wagering in the sense that the beneficiary
will suffer a true financial loss upon the death of the insured and, therefore,
gain no windfall from his death. Presumably, such a pecuniary interest
discourages the commission of homicide by the beneficiary as well.
While an insurable interest grounded in pecuniary considerations
might suggest its own unique problems worthy of attention, 14 it is rare that
an insured child would be in such a position as to be a pecuniary benefit to
the beneficiary.1 49 Therefore, it is the second basis for an insurable interest
that most directly impacts children.
The second basis for an insurable interest requires that the beneficiary
have a sufficient family tie to the insured such that the love and affection
the beneficiary has for the insured will cause the insured to wish the
continued existence of the insured life.so This prong appears to be aimed
directly at preventing insurance proceeds from becoming an incentive for
murder. Accordingly, the family ties generally must be quite close.
Most jurisdictions tend to agree that an insurable interest exists
between insureds and their relatives located along the vertical family tree. "'
Thus, a given individual has an insurable interest in his parents and his
children.' 52 On the other hand, the horizontal family tree is quite limited.
Spouses, of course, have insurable interests in each other,'53 while
145. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-58-80 (2011) ("Any partner has an insurable interest in
and the right to insure the physical ability or the life, or both the physical ability and the life, of
any other partner or partners who are members of the same partnership for his benefit, either alone
or jointly with another partner or partners of the same partnership."); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 114, § 43, at 296.
146. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-58-75 ("An employer, whether a partnership, joint
venture, business trust, mutual association, corporation, any other form of business organization,
or one or more individuals, or any religious, educational, or charitable corporation, institution or
body, has an insurable interest in and the right to insure the physical ability or the life, or both the
physical ability and the life, of an employee for the benefit of such employer."); JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 14, § 43, at 296.
147. See supra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
148. For example, one business partner might decide to murder the other to not only recover
the life insurance proceeds but to also avoid sharing some lucrative opportunity for the
partnership.
149. But see infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing "wait and see"
beneficiaries).
150. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
151. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 88, § 3.5, at 181.
152. Id. at 181-82.
153. Id. at 181.
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approaches vary in regard to siblings.'54 However, in the absence of a
pecuniary interest, the doctrine's list of acceptable beneficiaries generally
stops there; uncles, aunts, and cousins, with few exceptions, are outside the
reach of an insurable interest. 115 Courts vary regarding the effect of the
relationship between a stepparent and stepchild. 156
Further, unlike the doctrine's application to property insurance-
where its existence is often an after-the-fact of loss consideration and
defense to payment of the insurance proceeds-the insurable interest
doctrine's application to life insurance has teeth that presumably prompts
the insurers to make sure policies are in compliance with the doctrine on the
front-end before the policy is issued. Particularly regarding children, where
an insurer issues a policy that names a beneficiary who does not have an
insurable interest, and where the beneficiary subsequently murders the child
for the insurance proceeds, the insurer may be subject to a suit in
negligence.' 5 7
For example, in an Alabama case, an aunt murdered her niece, who
was a few months over two years of age, by serving her a soft drink that
contained arsenic.'15 Before she committed the murder, the aunt applied for
and acquired three life insurance policies on her niece's life naming herself
as the beneficiary to all three. 1 The young girl's father subsequently sued
all three insurance companies in negligence for issuing policies that made
the aunt, a person with no insurable interest, the beneficiary.' 60
After discussing the importance of the insurable interest doctrine in
protecting the lives of insureds,' 6' the court addressed the defendant
154. See, e.g., id. at 182 & n.7.
155. Id. at 182 & n.9.
156. See, e.g., Jerry & Richmond, supra note 114, § 43, at 295 ("As for the relationship
between a stepfather/stepmother and stepchild, the courts are not uniform. It would seem that
whether the step-parent/step-child relationship, without more, creates an insurable interest should
turn on whether the relationship is functionally equivalent to other kinds of familial relationships
where the insurable interest is found. For example, one court has held that adopting parents have
an insurable interest in a child after the child has been placed in the parents' home but before the
adoption decree becomes final. Although this decision can be explained based on the economic
interest adopting parents have both in the adoptee and in the adoption process being brought to a
successful conclusion, this result can also be founded on the fact that the adopting family during
the post-placement, pre-final decree period resembles, for all practical purposes, other family
units." (footnotes omitted)).
157. See id. § 47, at 313-14.
158. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 700, 703 (Ala. 1957).
159. Id. at 700.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 705 ("No principle of the law of life-insurance is at this day better settled, than
the doctrine, that a policy taken out by one person upon the life of another, in which he has no
insurable interest, is illegal and void, as repugnant to public policy. Such contracts are aptly
termed 'wager policies,' and are entitled to no higher dignity, in the eye of the law, than gambling
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insurance companies' argument that they owed no duty in negligence to
make sure the beneficiary had an insurable interest before issuing the
policy. 162
The position of the defendants seems to be that if murder results
the insurance companies are, of course, sorry that the insured met
with such a fate, but they have no liability if there is no insurable
interest although they can treat such policies as completely void. If an
early death from natural causes makes the policy unprofitable, the
defendants can and do refuse to pay the beneficiary for the reason
that such policies are void. In other words, the defendants seem to be
of the opinion that the insurable interest rule is to protect insurance
companies. We do not agree. The rule is designed to protect human
life. Policies in violation of the insurable interest rule are not
dangerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because they are
dangerous.
As we have shown, it has long been recognized by this court and
practically all courts in this country that an insured is placed in a
position of extreme danger where a policy of insurance is issued on
his life in favor of a beneficiary who has no insurable interest. There
is no legal justification for the creation of such a risk to an insured
and there is no social gain in the writing of a void policy of
insurance. Where this court has found that such policies are
unreasonably dangerous to the insured because of the risk of murder
and for this reason has declared such policies void, it would be an
anomaly to hold that insurance companies have no duty to use
reasonable care not to create a situation which may prove to be a
stimulus for murder.1 63
In the same case, the insurers argued that, regardless of any duty owed,
the act of the aunt in murdering the niece constituted an unforeseeable and
intervening cause such that their liability was severed. 6 4 The court stated:
We cannot agree with the defendants in their assertion that we
should hold as a matter of law that the murder of the young girl was
speculations, or idle bets as to the probable duration of human life. There is no limit as to the
insurable interest which a man may have in his own life; but there are forcible reasons why a
mere stranger should not be permitted to speculate upon the life of one whose continued existence
would bring to him no expectation of possible profit or advantage. All wagers, at common law,
were not illegal, but only such as were contrary to good morals or sound policy. The statutes of
this State make all contracts by way of gaming or wagering void. However this may be, wager
policies, or such as are procured by a person who has no interest in the subject of insurance, are
undoubtedly most pernicious in their tendencies, because in the nature of premiums upon the
clandestine taking of human lfe." (citations omitted) (quoting Helmetag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76
Ala. 183, 186 (Ala. 1884)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. Id. at 707-08.
163. Id. at 708.
164. Id. at 709.
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not reasonably foreseeable. They created a situation of a kind which
this court and others have consistently said affords temptation to a
recognizable percentage of humanity to commit murder.1 65
It would seem, then, that the courts tendency to limit the insurable
interest doctrine's acceptance of qualified beneficiaries to the closest of
relatives and that the bite of a negligence action for noncompliance with the
doctrine on the part of insurers would tend to deter insurers, if not
murderers, from ignoring the insurable interest doctrine such that children
should be relatively safe. However, such is not the case.
First, certain jurisdictions appear to take a rather reckless "wait and
see" approach in deciding whether a beneficiary had an insurable interest in
the life of the insured. 166 These courts do not set out a definitive list of
appropriate beneficiaries but instead analyze the relationship between the
insured and the beneficiary "after the fact" of the death of the insured to
decide whether the beneficiary had sufficient love and affection, perhaps
coupled with a vague pecuniary interest, for the insured so as to constitute
an insurable interest. 16 7 Of course, where it can be established that the
beneficiary murdered the insured, the analysis becomes irrelevant. 168
However, the fact that such an analysis is possible in certain jurisdictions no
doubt makes insurers less prudent in the face of such a vague application of
the law, lends support for insurers who argue that they were not negligent in
issuing a policy naming such an individual as the beneficiary, and does little
if anything to deter would-be murderers from rolling the dice on
committing murder with the hope of subsequently qualifying as a
beneficiary under such a nebulous standard.
Second, even in jurisdictions where the doctrine is well-defined and
where insurers may be subject to negligence suits, insurers continue to fail
in making sure the beneficiary has an insurable interest in the insured. Such
were the facts in young Brian's murder. 16 9
It is therefore evident that criminal and civil responses currently in
place to protect children from being murdered for the recovery of life
insurance proceeds are not serving the purpose of, in all instances,
protecting the children. Accordingly, other solutions to this horrible loss of
life are necessary.
165. Id.at711.
166. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
168. Tinio, supra note 47, at 802.
169. See supra notes 6-45 and accompanying text.
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IV. SCENARIOS OF RISK
Before offering proposals that might better protect children from
becoming the targets of murder for life insurance proceeds, it may be useful
to first consider the various scenarios through which children may be most
at risk and then measure proposed solutions for their effectiveness in light
of these scenarios. While there may be any number of fact-specific
situations in which children are placed at risk, they can be generalized into
two very broad categories. The first category includes scenarios that arise
where the beneficiary was an "unlawful beneficiary" in the sense that the
beneficiary defrauded the insurer into issuing the policy under which he
became an unlawful beneficiary, 7 0 or where the insurer acted carelessly or
negligently in issuing a policy naming him as beneficiary.1 7 ' The second
category includes scenarios that arise where the beneficiary was a "lawful
beneficiary" in that the beneficiary had the requisite insurable interest in the
insured child, but where the safety of the child was nonetheless at risk. 172
A. The Unlawful Beneficiary
In the first category, a person without an insurable interest, and
therefore one who lacks a sufficient family tie to suggest the presumptive
love and affection that would protect the child, has in some manner
managed to place himself in the position of beneficiary to the child's life
insurance policy. One scenario that might lead to this result is the instance
where the unlawful beneficiary defrauds an otherwise innocent insurer. For
example, the unlawful beneficiary might manage to convince the insurer
that he is, in fact, a parent or perhaps a grandparent to the child to be
insured and that he, therefore, does have an insurable interest in the child.
While this first scenario is worthy of consideration when exploring
ways in which to better protect children, it is a somewhat unlikely scenario
for at least two reasons. First, it would take a significant amount of planning
for the unlawful beneficiary to assume the identity of the child's parent or
grandparent so convincingly that the insurer would be innocently deceived.
At the very least, the unlawful beneficiary would likely have to create false
documents of identification. Second, assuming the subsequent murder of
the child results in an investigation, the fact that the unlawful beneficiary
assumed a false identity would seem to be a fact that would be easily
discovered and worthy of considerable suspicion.
170. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 704, 707 (Ala. 1957).
172. See cases cited supra note 84.
198 [Vol. 58:173
MURDER FOR LIFE INSURANCE MONEY
A second and more likely scenario would be the instance where a
fraudulent beneficiary is coupled with a negligent or at least careless
insurer, as opposed to an innocent insurer as in the above scenario. For
example, in one case a man successfully defrauded an insurer into believing
that he was the son of the person he proposed to insure.' 73 He obtained an
application from the insurer and told the insurer's representative that he
would take the application to his "father" to obtain his signature.17 4 The
insured life was an actual person, of course, but the man seeking to create
the insurance coverage was not his son."' The representative permitted the
man to take the application with him in violation of the insurer's own
procedural rules. 76 The man returned with the "signed" application, naming
himself as the beneficiary, and the insurer's representative further signed
the application "witnessing" the "father's" signature."' The "father" was
later found stabbed and beaten to death in his apartment, resulting in the
allegation that the beneficiary committed the murder." 8
While this case involves an adult beneficiary and an adult insured, it
illustrates how bold a person might be in defrauding an insurer and how
gullible and careless an insurer might be in issuing a life insurance policy.
This scenario partially explains what happened in young Brian's
case. 7 9 Brian's uncle obtained a life insurance application from the insurer
and then returned the application to the insurer after fraudulently forging
Brian's father's signature on the application, purporting to give the insurer
permission to insure Brian's life, and after naming himself the beneficiary
to the policy on the application.'s The insurer then acted carelessly, if not
negligently, in at least a couple of ways. First, the circumstances under
which Brian's father's signature appeared on the application suggests that
the insurer never actually discussed the matter with Brian's father but rather
took the uncle's "word" as true.'"' Second, apart from the forged signature,
the insurer caused an insurance policy to issue, naming Brian as the insured
life and Brian's uncle, who under state law did not have an insurable
173. Bajwa v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 804 N.E.2d 519, 523 (111. 2004).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 524.
179. See supra notes 6-45 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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interest in any event, as the beneficiary.182 Thus, this second scenario is not
only likely but now has a history.
The third scenario would be the instance where the unlawful
beneficiary did not act fraudulently but nonetheless became a beneficiary
under a policy insuring a child solely because of the negligence of the
insurer. Brian's case, as well as other cases,' 83 suggests that it is not out of
the realm of possibility that a person who does not have an insurable
interest could become the beneficiary to a child's life insurance policy for
the simple reason that insurance company personnel are not adequately
trained in the insurable interest doctrine or otherwise do not appreciate its
significance. Accordingly, an aunt, an uncle, or someone of even more
distant relation,18 4 who does not have an insurable interest in the child
might, without resort to fraud in any form, merely request and obtain such a
policy from a negligent insurer.' 85
In summary, an "unlawful beneficiary" is generally the product of a
fraudulent beneficiary, a negligent insurer, or both.
B. The Lawful Beneficiary
This second category that may result in risks to children insureds
includes scenarios where the beneficiary was a "lawful beneficiary" in that
the beneficiary did, in fact, have a lawfully recognized insurable interest in
the insured child, but where, due to various circumstances, the child
continues to be at risk.
The first scenario in this category of cases involves a lawful
beneficiary who actually should be deemed an unlawful beneficiary but,
due to the lax approach of state law, at least initially is deemed a lawful
beneficiary.' 86 For example, some jurisdictions take what can perhaps best
be described as a "wait and see" approach in determining whether a
beneficiary had a lawfully recognized insurable interest in the insured
life."' This approach permits a distant family member such as an aunt or
uncle, who otherwise would not qualify as a beneficiary to the child
because the familial relationship is not sufficiently close, to establish an
182. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; see also Wharton v. Home Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 173 S.E. 338, 339 (N.C. 1934) ("[I]t is very generally held that the relationship of uncle
and nephew does not of itself create an insurable interest in favor of either.").
183. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 704-05 (Ala. 1957).
184. Such a scenario would likely require that the unlawful beneficiary be at least related to
the child because it would seem that one who attempts to purchase a policy on a child without any
relation to the child would raise suspicion in even a negligent insurer.
185. E.g., Weldon, 100 So. 2d at 705-06.
186. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 88, § 3.5, at 182-83.
187. See id.
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insurable interest by buttressing a familial relationship with evidence of
some pecuniary interest in the child.'" "For example, a woman who had
supported her niece from infancy was held to have an insurable interest in
the niece's life on the basis of an expectation of pecuniary benefit incident
to what the court viewed as a moral obligation of the niece to the aunt."'89
The case referenced above illustrates both the application and the problem
with the "wait and see" approach.
An aunt or uncle, or some other distant relative who does not have a
sufficient familial connection to the child to establish an insurable interest
based upon presumptive love and affection, is nonetheless permitted to
become the child's life insurance beneficiary based upon a strained
contention that the relative has a pecuniary interest in the child pursuant to
some vague "moral obligation."'9 0 Then, upon the death of the child, this
being the "wait and see" aspect of this dangerous practice, the court
apparently examines the familial and pecuniary ties to the child and makes a
posthumous decision as to the existence of an insurable interest.19 '
Obviously, if it is discovered that the distant relative caused the death of the
child, the relative will not recover the life insurance proceeds and will
further suffer all the punishment the law can bring to bear.' 92
Problematically, of course, all of this occurs after the death of the child.
While a pecuniary interest can establish the existence of a sufficient
insurable interest in the life of another, such an interest is generally found
where the beneficiary has some realistic and continued source of income
provided by the insured life sufficient to cause the beneficiary to desire that
the insured life continue to exist. 93 Where the insured and the beneficiary
are both adults, such a pecuniary interest may in fact exist. However, as
previously discussed, the likelihood of an adult having a realistic pecuniary
interest in a child is practically nonexistent.'94 Permitting a distant relative
to become a lawful beneficiary to a child's life insurance policy on the
vague notion that the relative might receive future monetary compensation
from the child based on some "moral obligation" simply places the child at
great risk. The beneficiary, in the absence of significant love for the
insured, may be tempted to commit murder to make certain the "moral
obligation" is fulfilled.
188. Id. at 182 & n.9.
189. Id. at 182-83.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Tinio, supra note 47, at 802.
193. For example, the insured and the beneficiary may be business partners or the insured
may be the beneficiary's employee. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
194. But see KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 88, § 3.5, at 183.
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Jurisdictions that take this "wait and see" approach permit those who
have no insurable interest in a child to acquire an insurance policy on the
front-end, subject to finding no insurable interest on the back-end when it is
too late to protect the child. This practice places children at significant risk.
The second scenario involving a lawful beneficiary arises where a
parent, a grandparent or, theoretically at least, a sibling, who has a lawful
insurable interest in the life of the child acquires a life insurance policy on
the child and is appropriately named the beneficiary under the policy. The
lawful beneficiary then develops a relationship with a "significant other,"
perhaps a boyfriend or girlfriend who may or may not become a subsequent
spouse. The "significant other," who has no blood relationship to the child
and would otherwise have no insurable interest in the child, is then placed
in a position to benefit from the child's death through the lawful
beneficiary. Such a person might benefit from the policy directly, such as
by becoming a co-beneficiary with the lawful beneficiary upon marriage to
the lawful beneficiary,1 9 5 or indirectly through a less committed relationship
with the lawful beneficiary.1 9 6
For example, in one case a father and mother purchased a life
insurance policy on their child in the amount of $15,000, naming
themselves as beneficiaries, and subsequently divorced.197 The father
remarried and a short time before his four-year-old child died the father
amended the life insurance policy to name his second wife as a
beneficiary.1 98 The second wife was later charged with murdering the child
and, on appeal, the court affirmed her conviction without discussion of
whether a stepparent has an insurable interest in a stepchild.' 99 Thus, the
second wife, who otherwise would have had no insurable interest in the
child, placed herself in a position to benefit directly from the policy by
marrying the child's father and becoming a named beneficiary.200
Brian's case was somewhat similar, at least to the extent of the
involvement of a "significant other." Though Brian's uncle was not a lawful
beneficiary, he did acquire a life insurance policy on Brian's life.201 Then,
his girlfriend, or "significant other," placed herself in a position to benefit
195. E.g., State v. White, 457 S.E.2d 841, 845-47 (N.C. 1995).
196. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 764 A.2d 284, 289-91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000), rev'd, 803
A.2d 1034 (Md. 2002).
197. White, 457 S.E.2d at 846.
198. Id. at 845-47.
199. Id. at 845.
200. See id. at 845-47.
201. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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indirectly from the life insurance proceeds, assisted in planning the crime,
and then participated in its commission. 20 2
Though all the scenarios presented thus far can result in placing a child
in danger, the third and final scenario in this category is perhaps the most
gut-wrenching of all and the most difficult to prevent. In this third scenario,
someone with a lawful insurable interest, usually a parent, purchases a
policy on his or her child and then commits the murder for the proceeds.2 03
Of the various parties who qualify as having an insurable interest in a
child's life, perhaps none better reflect the love and affection for the child
upon which the insurable interest is based, than a parent. No fraud is
necessary by the parent,20 4 no negligence is required by the insurer,205 and
no potential lawful beneficiary raises less suspicion when attempting to
insure a child's life. However, because of the relative simplicity in
orchestrating this scenario, cases involving a homicidal parent may be more
plentiful than cases involving fraudulent beneficiaries, 20 6 "wait and see"
beneficiaries,207 or those who attempt to recover indirectly as a "significant
other."2 08
In summary, the scenarios involving lawful beneficiaries pose
significant risks to children for the very fact that the beneficiaries are
lawful. Whether the law is lax, the beneficiary meets a "significant other,"
or otherwise becomes greedy and homicidal, these cases arise because the
insurable interest doctrine does not contemplate these factual scenarios and
does not provide protection to the child in these instances.
Since criminal law responses do not adequately deter criminal conduct
in many of these cases, since the threat of a negligence suit does not always
cause insurers to properly apply the insurable interest doctrine, and since
the doctrine itself, even if applied properly, does not always guarantee the
safety of children insureds, other protective measures must be implemented
to stop these horrible murders for life insurance proceeds.
V. PROPOSED PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Perhaps the most certain and conclusive protective measure that can be
implemented to prevent the murder of children for life insurance proceeds is
to simply prohibit the issuance of life insurance policies covering children.
202. See supra notes 16-43 and accompanying text.
203. See cases cited supra note 84 (offering examples of parents who were charged with
murdering their children for the recovery of insurance proceeds).
204. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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However, because there are very good reasons why someone, typically a
parent, might want to insure a child's life, a blanket prohibition to such
coverage would completely frustrate otherwise good and necessary
intentions. For example, certain families would surely have difficulty
affording the high cost of even a simple funeral and burial for their child
without the availability of life insurance coverage on the child. This fact
alone justifies the continued practice of permitting life insurance on
children, at least in some minimal amount.
More problematically, a mother, a father, or both may suffer from a
hereditary disease and have a valid belief that their child will also develop
the disease as he ages. If the hereditary disease is one that might eventually
disqualify the child from purchasing life insurance himself when he gets
older, his parents might opt to purchase a policy on the child when he is
young and before the disease appears, so that he will have life insurance for
the ultimate benefit of his own spouse and children later in life. This fact
also justifies life insurance on children, and in this instance the amount of
insurance might even be significant if there is a concern that the child might
not later be able to increase the amount of insurance because of the
hereditary disease.
Accordingly, any protective measures must be calculated to continue
to permit the issuance of life insurance policies covering children while
simultaneously reducing the risk that a child might be murdered for the
insurance proceeds.
A. Narrowly Define the Insurable Interest Doctrine
The first such protective measure would be to narrowly and
specifically define the insurable interest doctrine, either by case law or
through legislation. As it pertains to children, the insurable interest doctrine
must be defined such that the only person who has an insurable interest in a
child, and therefore the only person who can become the beneficiary to such
a life insurance policy, is the child's parent(s) or a person who financially
stands in the place of the parent(s). This approach would conclusively
eliminate grandparents, siblings, and "wait and see" beneficiaries,2 09 except
where they stand in the place of a parent in terms of having financial
responsibility for the child. It would also advance the objective of the
insurable interest doctrine as it applies to children in that, in most instances,
it would limit potential beneficiaries to those who would seem to naturally
harbor the presumptive love and affection for the child that justifies the
doctrine in the first instance.
209. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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. Further, a policy insuring a child should issue only after the proposed
beneficiary provides birth and identification records proving that he or she
is the child's parent, or after providing legal documents proving that the
beneficiary financially stands in the place of the parent(s). At the very least,
this approach would significantly limit the pool of potential beneficiaries
and, therefore, limit the number of persons who might harm the child to
recover insurance proceeds.
Admittedly, this approach does not, of itself, preclude a "significant
other" from becoming involved with a parent and then harming a child,2 10
or preclude a parent from committing murder for the insurance proceeds.
Thus, other measures are necessary.
B. Penalize Insurers
Once the insurable interest doctrine has been cleaned up and narrowly
defined it must be enforced, not on the back-end by the courts but on the
front-end by insurers before the policy issues. Regulatory sanctions in the
form of hefty fines as well as license and certification revocations are likely
necessary to prompt such enforcement.
It is no secret that life insurance agents receive commissions for the
policies that they sell, so they have a strong financial incentive to sell as
many policies as possible.211 It is also no secret that life insurance
companies make much of their money from the premiums paid by insureds,
so they, too, have a financial incentive to sell as many policies as possible.
However, agents and insurance companies are also in the unique position of
being the only ones who can enforce a narrowly defined insurable interest
doctrine on the front-end by refusing to sell or issue a policy in
contravention of the doctrine. It is this tension between sales and child
safety that makes sanctions against agents and insurers necessary.
Brian's case illustrates the problem as well as the need for this
protective measure.2 12 There is little doubt that Brian's uncle knew that he
might face first-degree murder charges, along with appropriate punishment,
when he planned Brian's murder. Yet, this possibility did not deter his
criminal conduct. On the other hand, it is highly doubtful that Brian's uncle
knew he did not have an insurable interest in Brian's life when he first
sought to obtain insurance on Brian's life and name himself as beneficiary.
210. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
211. Cf Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo
Wrestling, AM. ECON. REv., Dec. 2002, at 1594, 1604 (discussing potential corruption in the sport
of sumo wrestling as the result of a system that financially rewards and incentivizes match
rigging).
212. See supra notes 6-45 and accompanying text.
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However, there is little doubt that the insurer and its agent knew that
Brian's uncle did not have a lawful insurable interest. There is also little
doubt that at least the insurance company was aware that issuing such a
policy might lead to a negligence action based on its negligent conduct.
Yet, in the face of this knowledge and deterrent, the agent sold the policy
and the insurer issued it.213
Since the threat of criminal action does not deter the unlawful
beneficiary,2 14 and since the threat of a civil action does not deter the agent
or the insurer,215 perhaps it is now time to consider other sanctions against
the agent and the insurer. Such sanctions might include imposing significant
monetary fines against both the agent and the insurer when they violate the
insurable interest doctrine and its procedures. Further, generally insurance
agents must be licensed,2 1 6 and insurance companies must be certified, or
permitted, to sell insurance within a particular state.217 Applicable sanctions
might therefore include license and certificate revocations.
Narrowing the doctrine's application and going to greater lengths to
make certain the doctrine is enforced at the front-end by insurers will help
protect children. However, a parent with a lawful insurable interest will still
be able to purchase a policy on a child and ultimately benefit from the
child's death. Therefore, other measures are still necessary to protect
children.
C. Limit Coverage
The third and final proposal to protect insured children is to limit the
amount of available coverage. This step would require legislative action
limiting the amount of coverage on a child's life to some specified amount
adequate to cover funeral and burial expenses. The limit would need to
remain in place until the child reaches a certain age, preferably eighteen.
213. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
216. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 1631 (West 2013), preempted by Rodriguez v. RWA Trucking
Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) ("Unless exempt by the provisions of this article,
a person shall not solicit, negotiate, or effect contracts of insurance, or act in any of the capacities
defined in Article 1 . . . unless the person holds a valid license from the commissioner authorizing
the person to act in that capacity. The issuance of a certificate of authority to an insurer does not
exempt an insurer from complying with this article.").
217. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-7-10 (2011) ("No domestic insurance company may issue
policies until upon examination of the Commissioner, his deputy or examiner, it is found to have
complied with the laws of the State, and until it has obtained from the Commissioner a certificate
setting forth that fact and authorizing it to issue policies. The issuing of policies in violation of this
section renders the company liable to the forfeiture prescribed by law, but such policies are
binding upon the company.").
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However, merely limiting the amount of coverage to a sum sufficient
to pay for funeral and burial expenses would not fully solve the problem.
This Article previously referenced a case in which a woman murdered a
child for the relatively small sum of $15,000,218 an amount which could
likely be described as a reasonable amount to pay for funeral and burial
expenses in many parts of the country.
For this reason, in addition to limiting the amount of coverage, such
legislation would further have to provide that the insuring agreement
between the parent and the insurance company must include a provision
making the funeral services provider the payee under the policy, with any
overage being paid to the parent or person who financially stands in the
place of the parent. If the amount of coverage is sufficiently limited, after
payment to the funeral services provider there should be such a minimal
amount of money left in the policy that no parent would risk a murder
conviction to recover it.
With the amount of coverage limited and payment being made directly
to the funeral services provider by the insurance company, the incentive to
commit murder is greatly reduced. However, these steps leave the problem
that arises when a parent wants to purchase life insurance on a child in a
large amount out of fear that the child may later develop a hereditary
disease and be rejected for life insurance coverage. The insurance limit
frustrates a parent's true and legitimate desire to protect the child in the
future as well as the child's future spouse and children.
However, there is certainly a method, likely again through legislative
action, by which to meet the parent's praise-worthy objective without
jeopardizing the safety of children. For example, a parent might be
permitted to purchase a life insurance policy on his or her own life, making
the child or a spouse the beneficiary, and then transfer the policy to the
child such that the child becomes the named insured at some specified age.
The child, or perhaps adult at the time, could then change the beneficiary
under the normal procedures for making such a change.
As another example, a parent might be permitted to purchase a policy
on his or her child's life, making himself or herself the beneficiary, but
limited in the amount of coverage as discussed earlier. Then, perhaps in
consideration of a one-time additional and reasonable fee, the parent could
also purchase an option to permit the child to increase the coverage when he
or she reaches a certain age regardless of health status of the child at that
time. The result would be that coverage would be limited through
childhood, thus reducing the incentive to murder the child, but could be
218. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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increased when the child reaches adulthood, again regardless of any
otherwise disqualifying disease that may be present at the time.
In either event, limiting the amount of available coverage and directing
that payment be made directly to the funeral services provider, when
coupled with narrowly defining the insurable interest doctrine, and making
certain insurers are enforcing its mandates, would provide children with the
protection they so badly need. These measures would effectively take the
targets off the children by minimizing the incentive and opportunity to
commit murder for life insurance proceeds.
V. CONCLUSION
Children are being murdered for life insurance proceeds. The current
legal responses to this problem are insufficient to protect children. Certain
legal responses are triggered only after the death of the child and, therefore,
provide no actual protection to the child, while those that appear to be
directed at protecting children are ineffective at best.
Under the current status of the law, a parent, grandparent, or even
older sibling can purchase a life insurance policy on a child and name
himself or herself the beneficiary to the policy. Further, the amount of
coverage is limited only by the ability to make the premium payments to
keep the policy intact. In some jurisdictions, an aunt, uncle, or perhaps even
more distant relatives can do the same upon a later showing of a pecuniary
interest in the child, such as some vague moral obligation the child has to
repay the relative for his generosity when the child was young.
The current status of the law is dangerous to children and new
measures are necessary for their protection. The remedies to the problem
proposed above will dramatically change the way life insurance covering
children is sold, written and managed, and will no doubt be deemed less
than desirable to some. However, the problem is real and the measures
taken to protect children must be effective. They are innocent and
vulnerable, and are not able to protect themselves.
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